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I. THE BURSTING BUBBLE
The technology and telecommunications boom made fools of all of us. From
the corporate executives who promised results that in hindsight seem absurd
to the ordinary day traders ... all were overcome with a complex mixture of
credulity, jealousy, vanity, and greed. In between were the enablers-the reg-
ulators, bankers, analysts, consultants, accountants, lawyers, credit agencies
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and journalists who could have done something to stop the madness, but did
nothing until way too late. 1
As the millennium approached, about half the households in the
United States owned stock2 and many of them had substantial sav-
ings and retirement funds invested either directly or indirectly in the
equity markets. 3 Some of those investors had experienced phenome-
nal gains during the run-up of share prices during the late 1990s,
while others were only just getting into the market, enticed by the
rapid stock appreciation that looked like it would never end.4
But beginning in April 2000, a swift downturn left investors reel-
ing. The Dow would eventually lose almost one-third of its value, and
the high-flying NASDAQ index would crash unbelievably worse, tum-
bling from over 5,000 to just about 1,100. It left shareholders in the
tech companies traded there with, on average, only about twenty per-
cent of the value they had had several years earlier.5
At first, the bursting bubble just seemed like another chapter of
the manic-depressive cycle of stock trading,6 a long-overdue correc-
1. Jonathan A. Knee, House of Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 7, at 14 (reviewing
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE RooM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); REBECCA SMITH & JOHN
R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: How Two WALL STREET JOURNAL REPORTERS UNCOV-
ERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2003)).
2. Andrew Leckey, Damage Claims Rising Among Hard-Hit Investors, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 2003, available at http://www.jsonline.com/bym/invest/
mar03/125085.asp.
3. Richard Dooling, A Fraud by Any Other Name, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, § 4, at
13.
4. Ruth Simon, With Wall Street on the Defensive, Claims Against Brokers Surge,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2003, at Al. For a confessional tale by a prominent mathe-
matician who suffered substantial losses during this period because of his hap-
less investment in WorldCom stock, see JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN
PLAYS THE STOCK MARKET (2003).
5. For an in-depth analysis of the performance of the Dow Jones index, see Dow
JONES & Co., Dow JONES INDEXES (2005), at http://www.djindexes.com. For simi-
lar information on the NASDAQ, see NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, INC., NASDAQ:
MARKET STATISTICS (Jan. 27, 2005), at http://www.nasdaq.comlnewsroomlstats/
main.stm.
6. See Kurt Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will Be Scandal, Count on It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at C3 (quoting CHARLES R. GEISST, WHEELS OF FORTUNE:
THE HISTORY OF SPECULATION FROM SCANDAL TO RESPECTABILITY (2002)). Geisst,
a Wall Street historian, finance professor, and author, stated: "I can't think of a
previous boom period, whether it was the 20's, the 60's or the 80's, where it hasn't
ended up a bloody mess, with declining asset values and cases of fraud." Id.
The stock market's surge in late 2003 made some feel that things had never
changed. As one commentator wrote:
At times it felt as if the bubble of the 1990s had never burst and inves-
tors had not learned the lessons the collapse was supposed to have im-
parted. Once again, investment bankers were peddling unproven stocks
and brokers and their clients were panting to get a crack at quick profits.
Patrick McGeehan, What Bubble? Wall Street's Fever Spikes Again, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2003, § 4, at 2.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion for all the "irrational exuberance"7 that had led purchasers to bid
the price of stocks in unproven companies to exorbitant heights. But
then commentators began to focus more intensely on what had driven
the speculative surge of the late 1990s and the groups that had engi-
neered and profited from it. Under that analysis, it seemed that ordi-
nary investors had been the victims of a pervasive "pump and down"
sting that took $6 trillion of the wealth they had placed in the capital
markets and transferred it to corporate and securities-industry
insiders.8
That devastating indictment, however, provoked a contrary expla-
nation premised on W.C. Fields' famous insight that "you can't cheat
an honest man."9 According to that theory, greedy investors had no
one to blame but themselves by expecting astronomical returns and
had gotten their just deserts for failing to exercise the ordinary pru-
dence required when entrusting money to high-risk ventures.10
II. A STRING OF CORPORATE SCANDALS
Then in the fall of 2001 came revelations of an unprecedented
string of corporate and accounting malfeasance that had fraudulently
fueled the market boom. It began with the disclosure that Enron had
7. The famous phrase, of course, comes from a speech by Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan in December 1996. Among other things, it provided the title of a
fine book on the boom years, ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000).
Cf Knee, supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing that the "madness" of
the technology and telecommunications boom made "fools" of everyone).
8. Simon, supra note 4. See also James Surowiecki, In Wall Street We Trust, NEW
YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 40 (commenting on a recent "$1.4-billion settlement
between Wall Street and state and federal regulators").
Public filings have disclosed large-scale selling by corporate insiders and
early-stage investors in technology stocks in the months immediately before the
NASDAQ crash. Mark Maremont et al., First in Line: Founding Investors and
Insiders Unloaded Tech Shares Before Fall, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2000, at Al. A
follow-up story told of a "$100 million club," an elite group of at least fifty insiders
at NASDAQ companies who collected immense fortunes in such sales. As one
commentator described the phenomenon: "It amounts to a huge transfer of
wealth from ordinary investors to those on the inside .... The little old lady in
Dubuque, Iowa, with the mutual fund in tech stocks is financing the Internet
entrepreneur's mansion on the Pacific Palisades." Mark Maremont & John Hech-
inger, If Only You'd Sold Some Stocks Earlier, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2001, at Al
(quoting William Braman, Chief Investment Officer at John Hancock Funds in
Boston).
9. The movie You CAN'T CHEAT AN HONEST MAN (Universal Pictures 1939), starred
Fields as the quick-witted, mean-spirited, degenerate drunk Larson E.
Whipsnade.
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Stan O'Neal, Risky Business,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2003, at A16 (noting that the CEO of Merrill Lynch, Inc.
discussed the need for investors to accept the risks inherent in our economic sys-
tem); PAULos, supra note 4 (detailing a prominent mathematician's experience
suffering substantial losses due to his ill-fated investment during this period).
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manipulated its profits by improperly hiding debt in off-book partner-
ships at the same time that it was manipulating the California and
Texas energy markets."1
By the end of 2002, over two dozen large public companies admit-
ted to inflating their revenues by improper accounting practices,12
while many of their top executives, like Dennis Koslowski of Tyco,13
lived opulent lifestyles at their shareholders' expense. Such chicanery
was facilitated by the firms' outside accountants, such as Arthur An-
dersen, which shredded documents when the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") began investigating the firm's auditing of
Enron.14
As these shenanigans were exposed, it became increasingly more
apparent that they were condoned by captive boards of directors' 5 and
were abetted by the deregulation of two sectors that had led the spik-
ing market-telecommunications and finance. 16 The recent resigna-
tion of New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") chairman Richard Grasso
reinforced outrage about such lax oversight when it came to light that
the Big Board's directors had only a vague understanding of how the
11. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); REBECCA SMITH & JOHN
R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: How Two WALL STREET JouRNAL REPORTERS UNCOV-
ERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2003). For good
discussions of the criminal charges pending against various Enron executives, see
Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002,
at C4; John R. Emshwiller & Ann Davis, Deal's Wake: Tiny Transaction Is Big
Focus of Prosecutors in Enron Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at Al; and Jeffrey
Toobin, End Run at Enron, NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2003, at 48.
In November 2004, a Houston federal jury found four former Merrill Lynch
bankers and one former Enron executive guilty of fraud for inflating the com-
pany's 1999 earnings. John R. Emshwiller & Kara Scannell, Enron Trial Results
in Five Guilty Verdicts-Convictions of Merrill Bankers Show Advisers Can Be
Held Liable for Helping to Mislead Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2004, at Cl.
12. Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, Forbes.com (Aug. 26, 2002), at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html. For a good descrip-
tion of one of the most notorious of these accounting scandals, WorldCom, see
Peter Elstrom, How to Hide $3.8 Billion in Expenses, Bus. WEEK, July 8, 2002, at
41.
13. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco's Ex-Chief Going to Court In 'Greed Case', N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2003, at Al.
14. For that action, Andersen was convicted of obstruction of justice. Kurt
Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2002, § 1, at 1.
For a discussion of the general reliability of audited financial reports, see Kurt
Eichenwald, Pushing Accounting Rules to the Edge of the Envelope, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2002, at Cl.
15. See Corporate Boards: The Way We Govern Now, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 59
(asserting that "[t]oo many boards are stuffed with yes men who question little
that their chief executives suggest.").
16. John Cassidy, Goodbye to All That: Who Killed the Boom? Two Economists Make
Their Cases, NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2003, at 94.
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lush compensation package they had unwittingly handed Grasso
might compromise the man charged with policing their industry's
trading practices. 17
But the most shocking disclosures of deceitful conduct by the se-
curities industry came in the spring of 2002 in a long-awaited global
settlement spearheaded by New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer.18 Ten of Wall Street's largest investment banking firms
agreed to pay $1.4 billion in penalties to settle charges of fraudulent
practices in which they had engaged during the go-go market of the
late 1990s.19 Spitzer's investigation found myriad instances where
17. Kurt Eichenwald, In a String of Corporate Troubles, Critics Focus on Boards'
Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, § 1, at 1; Gretchen Morgenson, As Scandals
Still Flare, Small Victories for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, § 3, at 1.
18. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
Statement by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the "Global Resolution"
of Wall Street Investigations (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/statements/global resolution.html. The basic facts that Spitzer's in-
vestigation of Merrill Lynch, Inc. uncovered are laid out in an affidavit of Eric R.
Dinallo, Assistant Attorney General of New York, Chief of the Investment Protec-
tion Bureau of the New York State Department of Law. Affidavit in Support of
Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, In re
Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2002), [hereinafter Affida-
vit of Eric C. Dinallo], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/
MerrillL.pdf. See also Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased By Undisclosed
Conflicts of Interest: Spitzer Obtains Court Order Requiring Key Disclosure (Apr.
8, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html
(containing links to related items, including the affidavit of Eric Dinallo and the
court order requiring certain disclosures by Merrill Lynch and other Wall Street
professionals).
For a fine article on the work by Spitzer, Dinallo, and the New York Attorney
General's Office, see John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled
Wall Street, NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54.
Spitzer's state investigation outdid the work of the federal agency charged
with protecting investors-the Securities and Exchange Commission. As one
commentator has recently noted about the SEC's lagged enforcement efforts: "[I]n
recent years the Securities and Exchange Commission lost its watchdog soul to
the interests it was created to regulate and is currently in search of it . .. ."
Michael Janeway, The Lord of Springwood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, § 7, at 14
(reviewing CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM
(2003)).
19. Stephen LaBaton, 10 Wall St. Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at Al; Gregory Zuckerman & Susanne Craig, Wall Street's
Payout: Too Little and Late?: Settlement Establishes $387.5 Million Fund, But
Check Isn't in Mail, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2003, at C1.
Reviewing the settlement, one commentator put it bluntly: "What jumps off
the page in these documents is the Wall Street firms' disregard for the individual
investors in pursuit of personal benefit." Gretchen Morgenson, In a Wall Street
Hierarchy, Short Shrift to Little Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at C1.
The settlement created a $387.5 million restitution fund for investors and
mandated that the firms pay $432.5 million over five years into an independent
research fund designed to provide unbiased research to investors. Jeff D. Opdyke
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market analysts had distorted their research reports or stock ratings
to win investment-banking business for their firms or in other ways
curry favor with their corporate clients. 20 For their deceit, the ana-
lysts were awarded huge bonuses.2 1
The most prominent examples of this unscrupulous activity were
the activities of two analysts who had become financial celebrities dur-
ing the market bubble-Henry Blodget and Jack Grubman.22
Blodget, Merrill Lynch's leading tracker of Internet stocks, was pub-
licly touting shares in companies that he was privately deriding in his
personal e-mails as 'junk."23 And proving that there are all sorts of
ways to be bribed, one of Grubman's many inflated stock valuations
was a rating he gave to a company in exchange for admission of his
children to an elite private school.24
III. REGULATING THE CONFLICTED SECURITIES INDUSTRY
In the largest sense, these pervasive fraudulent practices can be
seen as the invidious results of the inherently conflicted position occu-
pied by investment bankers and brokers. Stock traders and jobbers
make money-very good money-by selling the shares of companies to
the public, thus purporting to serve two masters with very different
interests. Their corporate clients want to sell their shares for the
highest price, while the public customers who buy them want fairly-
valued, quality investments. 25
Securities, unlike other items of investment property such as real
estate, have no intrinsic value in themselves. Rather, they represent
the right to something of value.2 6 Stock purchasers, therefore, must
& Ruth Simon, How You Come Out in Wall Street's Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29,
2003, at D1.
20. Randall Smith & Suzanne Craig, Wall Street's Payout: Too Little and Late?:
Spitzer Views Notes For Salomon Meeting As Crucial in Probe, WALL. ST. J., Apr.
29, 2003, at Cl.
Five of the brokerage firms'actually paid others to issue glowing research re-
ports of companies the firms had underwritten. Gretchen Morgenson, Shopping
Spree By the Famous 5, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, at C1.
21. One senior analyst receiving a $160,000 salary earned a bonus of $3.8 million.
Another analyst with a similar salary earned a $3 million bonus. Bert Caldwell,
Wall Street Practices Maddening, SPoKEsMAN-REv., May 11, 2003, at D1.
22. Editorial, Finding Fraud on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A28. Both
Grubman and Blodget agreed to lifetime bans from the securities industry in the
global settlement and paid fines totalling $19 million. Id.
23. Affidavit of Eric C. Dinallo, supra note 18, at 12. See also In re Merrill Lynch &
Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that Blodget "continued to
recommend companies that he internally described as a 'piece of crap,' 'piece of
junk' or 'piece of [expletive].'").
24. Cassidy, supra note 18.
25. Surowiecki, supra note 8.
26. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (6th ed. 2003).
20051
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have particular confidence in their brokers, and those salesmen, in
turn, seek to foster such a relationship of reliance. For instance, in its
promotional material Merrill Lynch speaks of its "tradition of trust"
where the interests of clients come first.2 7 Yet brokers are typically
compensated by commission. 28 As the skeptical insight goes, when a
broker recommends a stock, the purchaser does not know whether the
broker thinks it is in the purchaser's best interest to buy it, or whether
the broker just needs the sale to make a car payment.
Because of this obvious conflict of interest and because securities
are such intricate merchandise (i.e., a pure bundle of rights, not a dis-
crete piece of solid property),29 the law has heavily regulated the sale
of securities. The basic legal mandate is that anyone participating in
the marketing of securities must reveal all relevant facts about
them.30
This regime of full disclosure is encapsulated in the SEC's re-
nowned Rule 10b-5,31 promulgated under the authority of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.32 Rule 10b-5 is a criminal provision
prohibiting all deceitful practices and schemes to defraud in connec-
tion with the purchase and sale of securities. 3 3 For almost sixty years,
courts have also implied a private right of action from that rule, al-
lowing defrauded investors to use it to recover damages. 34 In addi-
tion, the practices of brokers and all who underwrite the sale of
securities are highly regulated by the SEC and by the self-regulatory
agencies of which they are members, most prominently the New York
27. Pat Huddleston II et al., Fraud in the Boardroom: Protect Investors From Bro-
kers, 39 TRIAL 38 (Apr. 2003).
The brokerage business usually involves a personal relationship. "An investor
who has his money with Merrill Lynch forms a bond with his broker, not the
firm." Surowiecki, supra note 8, at 40.
Of late, brokerage firms have taken to a new form of advertising, purchasing
the rights to name football stadiums, e.g., Edward D. Jones Stadium, where the
St. Louis Rams play, and Raymond James Stadium, home of the Tampa Bay
Buccaneers.
28. Stephen J. Friedman, A Comment on Judge Selya's Arbitration Unbound?: The
Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1996).
29. See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 26, at 1, and accompanying text.
30. HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 26, at 2.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000). The enabling section of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is section 10(b). Id. § 78j(b).
33. For a good general discussion of the jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5, see THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 568-628 (4th ed. 2002).
34. The first such case was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946), and the Supreme Court upheld that right in Superintendent of Insur-
ance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), and
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
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Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers("NASD").35
As Holmes famously observed, all our notions of civil and criminal
liability are probably rooted in a primal desire to take revenge on
those who have injured us. 36 In that vein, the reasons to allow inves-
tors to recover from those who have cheated them are obvious. In ad-
dition, one does not have to cite the Ten Commandments 3 7 or the
categorical imperative 3S to prove that fraud is bad. Furthermore, it
seems that law-and-economics types belabor the obvious when they
assert that situations involving asymmetrical understandings of infor-
mation distort markets.39
IV. THE SUPREME COURT TURNS AWAY FROM
INVESTOR PROTECTION
In roughly the two decades between the mid-1970s and the mid-
1990s, however, the federal securities laws became progressively less
friendly to the claims of investors. 40 This occurred through both new
legislation and judicial interpretation of existing statutes.
First, in a string of opinions in the 1970s, the Supreme Court im-
posed new restrictions on private claims brought under Rule 10b-5.
Those cases required that the plaintiff allege that an actual purchase
or sale of securities had occurred, 4 1 that the defendant acted with sci-
35. See generally, HAZEN, supra note 33, at 758-68 (providing an overview of SEC
regulation, self-regulation, NASD, and the national exchanges).
36. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 39 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
37. The eighth commandment states: "You shall not steal." Exodus 20:15 (New King
James). Of course, many moral teachers have warned against the corrupting
force of personal avarice. For an eloquent modern treatment, see Pope Paul VI,
Populorum Progessio: Encyclical on the Development of Peoples (Mar. 26, 1967),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/paul-vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_
p-vi-enc 26031967_populorum.en.html.
38. "I should never act in such a way that I could not will that my maxim should be
universal law." Immanuel Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, in
ETHICS 194-95 (Oliver Johnson ed., 8th ed. 1999).
39. Cassidy, supra note 16 (citing the work of Nobel-award-winning economist Jo-
seph E. Stiglitz for that proposition). Cassidy also discusses JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
THE ROARING NINETIES (2003), a book on the boom and bust. Cassidy summa-
rizes Stiglitz's writing about the evils that propelled the market's surge in the
late 1990s with this statement: "Accounting standards were allowed to slacken,
deregulation was mindlessly pursued, and corporate greed indulged." Cassidy,
supra note 16, at 94.
40. For an excellent summary of these trends, see Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbi-
tration: Better for Investors Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996).
41. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
7392005]
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enter,4 2 and that deception had been involved by way of either a mis-
representation or a nondisclosure of material fact. 43
The first decision ruled out 10b-5 claims arising from a fraud that
caused an investor to refrain from selling or buying a particular secur-
ity.44 The second meant that mere negligent misrepresentation was
no longer actionable under that provision of the federal securities
laws.45 And the third decision, demanding actual deception, seemed
to preclude claims not involving actual misstatement or concealment
of material fact. 46
Later rulings from the High Court and lower federal appellate
courts provided additional barriers to investor suits. For instance, a
ruling from the Supreme Court shortened statutes of limitations in
securities fraud cases. 47 A decision from the Second Circuit condoned
egregious puffery by a broker-like, "this is a marvelous invest-
ment"-on the grounds that it was either not material or the inves-
tor's reliance on such statements was unjustified.48 And an opinion
from the Seventh Circuit appeared to apply a very narrow version of
the parol evidence rule to disregard blatantly false oral statements by
a broker that were negated by boiler-plate disclosures in written docu-
ments supplied to the investor.4 9
Those unhelpful rulings were capped off by two Supreme Court de-
cisions in the mid-1990s that further slammed the courthouse door on
meaningful investor claims. First, the Court gave an overly restrictive
interpretation to an express cause of action that might have provided
liability for fraud in the sale of securities upon a lesser showing of
intent than the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5.5o Then, it inter-
preted Rule 10b-5 itself as precluding a remedy against those who are
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
43. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
44. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755.
45. The Hochfelder Court left open the possibility that reckless behavior might be
sufficient for civil liability under Rule 10b-5. Hoch[elder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.il.
46. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 475-76. As to how this might affect certain claims
against brokers for breach of fiduciary duty or under the "shingle theory," see
infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
47. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
48. Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984). For a fine critique of this defense,
see Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence
of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697
(1998).
49. Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1325 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that warnings and
statements contained in private placement memorandum would be imputed to
the purchaser even though the purchaser had not read the memorandum).
50. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). The provision interpreted in Gus-
tafson is section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000).
In Gustafson, the Court held that provision only applicable to material misstate-
ments or omissions in SEC-registered public offerings. 513 U.S. at 584.
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secondarily responsible for a securities fraud, directly ruling out aid-
ing and abetting liability5i and, according to most readings, respon-
deat superior claims as well. 5 2
On top of all these judicial wounds, a newly Republican-controlled
Congress also stepped in to give investors the federal coup de grace
with the passage, over President Clinton's veto, of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") in 1995.53 The legislation con-
tained a host of restrictions on claims under the federal securities
laws, particularly a more stringent legislative reinforcement of the re-
quirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that fraud be plead
with particularity. 54
V. SOME PROMISE OF INVESTOR RELIEF IN THE
ENRON LITIGATION
Those restrictive developments put up some stiff barriers for inves-
tors seeking relief for the egregious frauds perpetrated during the re-
cent market bubble. Yet, preliminary results in one such suit arising
out of the Enron scandal 55 evince a residuum of judicial sympathy for
shareholder rights.
Investors there who had purchased Enron's publicly-traded securi-
ties for a period of time before the firm's collapse brought a class ac-
tion against a host of defendants connected with the company. 56
Included were not only the bankrupt firm's former lead officers and
directors, but also its lawyers and auditors. Particularly targeted
were banks that had provided a myriad of financial services to Enron,
such as underwriting its securities and making loans to many of the
51. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
52. See id. at 200 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). The leg-
islation amends the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000) ("Secur-
ities Act"), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78mm
(2000) ("Exchange Act").
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The PSLRA added that provision to the Exchange Act as
new section 21D(b). Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995) (codified as 15
U.S.C. § 78u-(4)(b)(1) (2000)). Among other restrictions, the PSLRA requires that
discovery be stayed while any motion to dismiss is pending. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
(4)(b)(1) (2000). In effect, it thus forecloses a plaintiff from satisfying the "speci-
ficity" provision by ascertaining facts through discovery.
In 1998, Congress preempted class action suits for securities fraud in state
courts by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998), thus making the restrictive provisions
of the PSLRA applicable to all such suits.
55. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
56. Id. at 563.
2005]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
so-called "special purpose entities" ("SPEs") that had important, but
undisclosed relationships with the company.
Counsel for lead plaintiffs, the renowned Bill Lerach, filed a com-
plaint of nearly 500 pages 5 7 that characterized Enron's operations as
"an enormous Ponzi scheme, the largest in history."5 8 It alleged that
the company purported to be generating income from arms-length
transactions with SPEs that it in fact controlled.
The resulting phony revenue kept the company's stock price artifi-
cially high. It was thus able to sustain its operations by constantly
raising fresh cash through a number of public securities offerings. In
addition to vastly enriching all the Enron insiders, those bogus deal-
ings generated huge fees for the company's bankers, lawyers, and
outside accountants-all allegedly complicit in the ongoing fraud.59
Lerach has publicly stated that the banks, lush with cash from the
boom times, are his principal target, and he has set his sights on a
multi-billion-dollar recovery. 60 Thus, the motions to dismiss filed by
the secondary defendants constituted a crucial phase in the litigation.
There, the secondary defendants raised a raft of arguments that their
liability was precluded by the jurisprudence of securities litigation as
it had developed over the last several decades. Chief among the argu-
ments was that their status as secondary defendants made them, at
most, "aiders and abettors" of the fraud and thus impervious to a Rule
10b-5 federal claim under the Central Bank decision. 6 1
The lead plaintiff countered that argument with this assertion:
"The key to the Enron mess is that the company was allowed to give
misleading financial information to the world for years."6 2 And that
could only be done by the "active and knowing involvement" 63 of the
company's lawyers, accountants, and bankers. Further, as motivating
evidence of their full participation in the fraud, the lead plaintiff cited
the spectacular fees gained by those defendants, particularly by the
57. Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron, NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 86. Ler-
ach, a partner in the firm of Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins,
LLP, has issued his own report on the recent scandals, WILLIAM S. LERACH, PLUN-
DERING AMERICA: How AMERICAN INVESTORS GOT TAKEN FOR TRILLIONS BY CORPO-
RATE INSIDERS (2002), available at http'//www.lerachlaw.com/pdf/news/
plundering-america.pdf.
58. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
59. Id. at 614.
60. Toobin, supra note 57.
61. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 582. See generally supra note 51 and accompany-
ing text (describing how the interpretation of 10b-5 in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), ruled out aid-
ing and abetting liability).
62. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
63. Id.
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banks, from their "long gravy train of lucrative underwriting of Enron
stock and bond offerings."
6 4
In response to those arguments, the district court, in a lengthy
opinion, analyzed the allegations of wrongful conduct made in the
complaint against each of the defendants. It found, for the most part,
that the plaintiffs had met their pleading standards by alleging, with
the requisite particularity,6 5 that each defendant was potentially cul-
pable for its primary involvement in the fraud. As to most of the
banks, that was evidenced by the charges that they knew Enron was
falsifying its publicly-reported financial results, yet they actively kept
the scheme going by making loans to the company to keep it afloat and
underwriting the sale of its securities to the public to bring in fresh
cash.6 6
Similarly, the court refused to dismiss both Enron's lawyers 6 7 and
its auditors, 68 finding that, according to the allegations stated, they
also could have knowingly participated in the fraud. Not only did the
attorneys provide advice on the structuring of almost every bogus
transaction, but they also publicly condoned them by giving their opin-
ion that they were bona fide dealings.
As to the auditors, the firm of Arthur Andersen, which reaped ap-
proximately $50 million in annual fees from Enron,69 gave clean opin-
ions to the company's financial statements, despite allegedly knowing
that they contained numerous falsehoods. Most blatantly, Andersen
condoned the nondisclosure of the various SPEs that Enron created to
hide its debt, even though those obligations would become an immedi-
ate liability for Enron if the company's stock price fell below a certain
level. Enron's audited financial statements contained no mention of
those potential liabilities. 70
In a subsequent opinion, the court held that the partners of Ander-
sen who had worked on the Enron account could not be held liable
individually under Rule 10b-5.71 The facts of their personal participa-
tion and putative scienter had not been alleged with the heightened
pleading standards required by the PSLRA.72 Yet, those individual
partners would nonetheless be held in the case as defendants, because
they could be responsible as control persons of Andersen under section
64. Id.
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66. See In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 636-56.
67. Id. at 656-69.
68. Id. at 673-85.
69. Id. at 673.
70. Id. at 680-84.
71. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. MDL-1446, Civ.A. H-01-
3624, 2003 WL 230688, at *1-7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2003).
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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20(a) of the Exchange Act.73 Such liability required no actual showing
of personal fraud that would necessitate particularized pleading
under the PSLRA.74
In like fashion, a later opinion also refused to dismiss Enron's
outside directors, even though no specific facts of their knowing partic-
ipation in the fraud had been alleged.75 Like the individual Andersen
partners,7 6 they also could be held liable as control persons of Enron.
In addition, they still could face liability under section 11 of the Secur-
ities Act77 for the false statements contained in Enron's SEC registra-
tion statements under a mere negligence standard.78
One month later, the court issued an additional ruling refusing to
dismiss key members of Enron's day-to-day management team. 79 In
addition to ample particularized pleading of their knowing involve-
ments in the company's multiple fraudulent transactions,8 0 they, like
the outside directors, were also potentially liable as control persons of
Enron.S1 Further, substantial evidence existed that those individuals
had made enormous profit from personal sales of Enron stock that
could constitute insider trading.8 2
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2000).
74. In re Enron, 2003 WL 230688, at *8-20.
75. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
76. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
78. In re Enron, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96. To escape such liability, defendants in a
section 11 claim must prove affirmatively that they acted with the requisite "due
diligence" to investigate the truth of the assertions made in the registration
statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2000).
79. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litigation, No. CIV.A.H-01-3624,
2003 WL 21418157, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2003).
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id. passim.
82. Id. at *7, *10, *15. The allegation here is that the insider defendants sold stock
after becoming aware of adverse information about the company's scheme to de-
fraud when such information was not available to the public. This violates Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000), and Rule 10b-5. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
In response to disclosure of the Enron fraud, the federal government launched
a massive white-collar criminal investigation. Although Enron's former trea-
surer has pled guilty, one noted commentator is skeptical that the government
will be able to obtain criminal convictions of Enron's top management. Toobin,
supra note 11. In addition, Andrew Fastow, Enron's Chief Financial Officer, has
pled guilty to wire and securities fraud and agreed to cooperate with the govern-
ment in its prosecutions of Enron's chairman Kenneth Lay and its Chief Operat-
ing Officer Jeffrey Skilling. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Press
Release No. 2004-6, Andrew S. Fastow, Former Enron Chief Financial Officer,
Pleads Guilty, Settles Civil Fraud Charges and Agrees To Cooperate with Ongo-
ing Investigation, (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2004-6.htm.
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VI. MIXED RESULTS IN MARKET FRAUD LITIGATION
In another series of federal court actions growing out of such corpo-
rate scandals, however, plaintiffs have not fared so well. Those suits
targeted Merrill Lynch, one of the major securities firms that spon-
sored and allegedly profited from fraudulent research reports by its
analysts, among them the notorious Henry Blodget.
In one action, nonclients of Merrill Lynch alleged that the firm's
fraudulent reports about stocks they held caused them substantial
losses when the prices of those securities collapsed with the "bursting
of the Internet bubble."8 3 In another, investors in mutual funds spon-
sored by Merill Lynch sought damages for losses, which they claimed
resulted from the firm's misleading and compromised research reports
on stocks in the fund.8
4
The district court began its opinion in the action by Merrill Lynch's
nonclients by leaving no doubt that it regarded their claims with scant
sympathy:
The record clearly reveals that plaintiffs were among the high-risk specula-
tors who, knowing full well or being properly chargeable with appreciation of
the unjustifiable risks they were undertaking in the extremely volatile and
highly untested stocks at issue, now hope to twist the federal securities laws
into a scheme of cost-free speculators' insurance.
8 5
The court went on to note that none of the investors claimed to
have actually read the allegedly false reports.8 6 Instead, they sought
to establish their reliance on the misleading information by the fraud-
on-the-market theory, which holds that most publicly-available infor-
mation is reflected in a stock's market price.8 7 Yet, the court found
For an interesting report on how prosecutors are focusing on one small trans-
action as the heart of their case against some of the top insiders, see Emshwiller,
supra note 11.
83. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
84. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
85. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 358. The remainder of the Court's open-
ing remarks are even more scathing:
Seeking to lay the blame for the enormous Internet Bubble solely at the
feet of a single actor, Merrill Lynch, plaintiffs would have this Court con-
clude that the federal securities laws were meant to underwrite, subsi-
dize, and encourage their rash speculation in joining a freewheeling
casino that lured thousands obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian
riches, but which delivered such riches to only a scant handful of lucky
winners. Those few lucky winners, who are not before the Court, now
hold the monies that the unlucky plaintiffs have lost-fair and square-
and they will never return those monies to plaintiffs. Had plaintiffs
themselves won the game instead of losing, they would have owed not a
single penny of their winnings to those they left to hold the bag (or to
defendants).
Id.
86. Id. at 359.
87. Id.
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that the plaintiffs' complaint lacked many elements of a cognizable
claim under Rule 10b-5.
Principal among those deficiencies was a failure to plead loss cau-
sation with specificity. Even though the alleged misrepresentations
may have artificially inflated the price of the securities, there was no
showing that they caused the stock's precipitous decline in value.8 8
That happened when the Internet bubble burst, well before the fraud-
ulent nature of Merrill Lynch's reports became known.8 9
In addition, the court found that, since the research reports were
statements of opinion, the plaintiffs had not met the standards of
specificity in their pleading to establish that the defendants did not
reasonably believe them to be true.90 Also flowing from the reports'
nature as opinions, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine protected them
from liability if inaccurate, because they were accompanied by cau-
tionary language. 9 1
Even the fraud-on-the-market theory was at least partially inap-
plicable, the court said, because the market was fully aware of many
of the conflicts tainting the recommendations that the defendant al-
legedly failed to disclose.92 The court also took a narrow view of the
one-year statute of limitations, finding that the plaintiffs were on in-
quiry notice of the basic facts underlying their claim before that time
and were therefore precluded from legal action now. 93
The investors in Merrill Lynch's mutual funds fared no better in
their suit, where they too claimed damages based on the firm's false
research reports and undisclosed conflicts of interest.94 Once again,
the district court found that the plaintiffs had not proven that their
losses were caused by the alleged misrepresentations as required in
Rule 10b-5 actions. 95
The court there likewise held that the plaintiffs had failed to state
claims under certain provisions of the federal securities laws because,
among other things, the defendants had no duty to disclose the alleg-
88. Id. at 361-64.
89. Id. at 358-59.
90. Id. at 368-75.
91. Id. at 375-77. See Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir.
1988), for a judicial opinion on a similar issue where the Seventh Circuit found
that cautionary language in the documents furnished to investors negated cer-
tain oral misrepresentations made in connection with the sale of securities. For a
fine article on this topic, see Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Cau-
tion Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 619 (1997).
92. In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
93. Id. at 378-82. See generally supra note 47 and accompanying text (stating that
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991),
shortened statutes of limitations in securities fraud cases).
94. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
95. Id. at 260-61.
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edly omitted information 96 and the complaint did not plead their sci-
enter with the requisite specificity.9 7 Similar actions based on
allegedly false statements in other research reports 98 and in connec-
tion with other Merrill-sponsored funds 9 9 were also dismissed by the
court for much the same reasons.
Investors found more promise of relief in a major consolidated ac-
tion challenging the practices of a number of investment banks that
drove up the price of initial public offerings that they underwrote.
100
At issue were the actions of those financial institutions in connection
with over three hundred high-tech and Internet companies which they
took public during the boom.
The plaintiffs alleged a widespread scheme to allocate the initial
shares in those "hot issues" that required the purchasers to resell the
stock in the aftermarket to artificially push up their prices.1 ° 1 The
plan also obliged those sellers to kick back part of their profit to the
allocating underwriters. To cover up the scheme, the defendants al-
legedly made misleading statements in their offering documents.
The district court sustained a majority of the plaintiffs' claims,
finding that the "scheme offends the very purpose of the securities
laws."102 Since the fraud occurred in connection with false and mis-
leading statements made in SEC registration statements, claims
under section 11 of the Securities Act were proper, as were actions
under section 15 against those who controlled violators of that
provision. 103
In similar fashion, the court also upheld claims under section 10(b)
for both material misstatements and market manipulation. As to
most of the defendants, the plaintiffs met their burden of pleading
with particularity, both as to the underlying fraudulent statements
and practices and the requisite scienter. Plaintiffs were also able to
show to the court's satisfaction that they suffered significant financial
loss based on the inflated prices they paid for the securities as opposed
to their true value.1° 4
96. Id. at 248-52.
97. Id. at 262.
98. In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
99. In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
100. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
101. Id. at 293-95.
102. Id. at 295'
103. Id. at 296.
104. Id. at 296-98. In a news commentary after the ruling, one prominent Wall Street
analyst ventured the opinion that the 50 financial firms named in the case might
be willing to settle the matter for $3 billion in total damages. Steve Maich, Wall
Street Readies to Pay Up-Again: IPO Class Actions: Brokerages May Pay $3-
Billion to Settle Suits Quickly, NAT'L POST, Feb. 21, 2003.
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VII. CUSTOMER CLAIMS AGAINST BROKERS
In light of the uncertainty of shareholder recovery in the class ac-
tion suits discussed supra, a more promising alternative for individual
investors may be a direct claim against the broker who sold them the
securities. Brokers, of course, are agents for their customers (the prin-
cipals) and therefore have the legal duties incumbent in such relation-
ships.105 But many courts have gone beyond agency law to find that a
fiduciary relationship exists in this context 1 O6-particularly when an
unsophisticated client places his trust in a broker expecting that she
has superior knowledge and skill about investments.107
Such a duty is reinforced when a broker is in control of the client's
account.1 0 8 This can exist either explicitly, as when the customer has
given the broker discretionary trading authority,109 or, more often, by
a state of affairs giving the broker effective control as when she knows
that the customer is inexperienced and will be relying on her
recommendations. 1o
These considerations are augmented by a parallel supposition that
takes into account the professional nature of the securities business.
It recognizes that brokers hold themselves out as implicitly represent-
ing that they will deal fairly with their customers.Il' For instance,
customers have a right to expect that brokers will have a reasonable
basis for the stock purchases they recommend.112 The SEC has
dubbed this the "shingle theory."'113 Using its authority under the
105. Those duties include "loyalty and good faith, obedience to instructions, and the
use of reasonable skill, care, and diligence." Carol R. Goforth, Stockbrokers' Du-
ties to Their Customers, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 407, 410 (1989) (footnotes omitted);
see also Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-
Dealer Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CoRP. L. 65, 75 (1997) (dis-
cussing the duties of brokers).
106. Goforth, supra note 105, at 417-31; Weiss, supra note 105. On the fiduciary obli-
gations of brokers generally, see HAZEN, supra note 33, at 828-31.
107. Goforth, supra note 105, at 422-29; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and
Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1247, 1249-50 (1983) (dis-
cussing the duties and responsibilities of fiduciaries in general).
108. Goforth, supra note 105, at 427-29; Mark C. Jensen, Abuse of Discretion Claims
Under Rule 10b-5: Churning, Unsuitability and Unauthorized Transactions, 18
SEC. REG. L.J. 374, 377-80 (1991).
109. Goforth, supra note 105, at 422-25.
110. Id. at 425-27.
111. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1006 (2002); Weiss, supra note
105, at 88.
112. Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271,
1276 (1995).
113. The term was originally coined by Professor Louis Loss: "The theory is that even
a dealer at arm's length impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that
he will deal fairly with the public." Louis Loss, The SEC and the Broker-Dealer, 1
VAND. L. REV. 516, 518 (1948).
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anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act, the Commission has ap-
plied the shingle theory to discipline securities professionals for a host
of abusive activities toward their clients.114
Almost all customer actions charge that brokers have breached
their legal duties to customers. In addition, they usually involve one
or more of the following four substantive claims, which can be conve-
niently, albeit a bit prejudicially, summarized under the acronym
SCUM.115 They are: (1) suitability, (2) churning, (3) unauthorized
trading, and (4) misrepresentation.
Suitability claims typically charge that a broker has recommended
that a client invest in securities that are inappropriate for her finan-
cial situation-usually because the securities were too risky, given the
client's age and resources.116 Relevant here are NYSE 1 17 and
NASD118 rules that require, respectively, that brokers know their cus-
tomers and have reasonable grounds to believe that their recommen-
dations are appropriate for their customers' needs.
But how far does this responsibility go? Some decisions appear to
hold brokers to the highest duty, making them liable for the losses
caused by customers' unsuitable investments even when the clients
had voluntarily chosen to disregard the brokers' advice that the secur-
ities were inappropriate for them.1 19 This has been called the "dram
114. See generally HAZEN, supra note 33, at 831-33 (giving a general overview of the
"shingle theory" and its uses); Karmel, supra note 112, at 1278-92 (analyzing
numerous cases in which courts applied the "shingle theory" in finding liability
for securities violations).
115. Black & Gross, supra note 111, at 1008-09.
116. See generally HAZEN, supra note 33, at 833-39 (discussing a broker's obligation to
customers with regard to the suitability of recommendations); Jensen, supra note
108, at 380-86 (describing the origin, development, and application of the unsuit-
ability claim); Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Economic
Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805 (1985) (reviewing
suitability rules governing brokers based on traditional legal guidelines as well
as current economic thought).
For more specialized approaches to this problem taking into account the so-
phisticated nature of certain investors, see Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-
Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 1493 (2001), and Stuart D. Root, Suitability-The Sophisticated Investor-
And Modern Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 287 (1991).
117. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE R. 405 (1970) (providing that members must "[u]se due
diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer"), reprinted in 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) T 2405 (Sept. 2004).
118. NAT'L ASS'N SEC. DEALERS CONDUCT RULES § 2310 (1996) (providing that in rec-
ommending a security transaction to a customer, "a member shall have reasona-
ble grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer"), reprinted in [1996] NASD Manual (CCH) 4261 (Dec. 2003). As to
when a Rule lOb-5 private right of action may arise under these provision, see
HAZEN, supra note 33, at 835-36.
119. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Beyond Precedent: Arbitral Extensions
of Securities Law, 57 Bus. LAW. 999, 1011-13 (2002). Such an approach could be
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shop" approach, analogizing to the old common law rule that made
tavern owners liable for all resulting damages if they continued to
serve obviously inebriated patrons. 120
The SEC recently came close to approving that understanding
when it held the following in a disciplinary proceeding:
Even if we were to accept [the broker's] view that these clients wanted to spec-
ulate and were aware of the risks... the Commission has held on many occa-
sions that the test is not whether [the customers] considered the transactions
in their account suitable, but whether [the broker] "fulfilled the obligation he
assumed when he undertook to counsel [them], of making only such recom-
mendations as would be consistent with [their] financial situation and
needs."1 2 1
Churning is the second typical complaint made by customers
against their brokers. It is evidenced by a pattern of large or frequent
trading in accounts over which brokers have actual or de facto discre-
tionary power.122 Such trades typically make little profit for the cus-
tomer but garner substantial commissions for the broker and his
house.123 This allegation is closely tied to a claim that the broker has
breached his fiduciary duty, because in both he must be said to control
the account. 1 24
Unauthorized trading claims frequently arise out of the same facts
that give rise to a charge of churning.125 Such activity, of course, di-
rectly violates a broker's duty as an agent to execute only those trans-
actions authorized by his principal, the client. 126
Misrepresentation is the fourth typical claim brought against bro-
kers. Outright misstatements and omissions of material facts are di-
considered paternalistic. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
120. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 119, at 1001, 1011.
121. In re Application of Rangen, 52 S.E.C. 1304, 1308 (1977) (quoting In re Phillips &
Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956)).
122. Jensen, supra note 108, at 377-80.
123. In the words of one court, evidence of excessive trading showed at best "a reckless
disregard for the client's investment concerns, and, at worst, an outright scheme
to defraud the plaintiff." Mihara v. Dean Witter Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir.
1980).
124. Even when the customer exercises formal control over the account, churning is
actionable upon a showing of de facto control by the broker "if [the] customer is
unable to evaluate [the broker's] recommendations and to exercise an indepen-
dent judgment." Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th
Cir. 1983).
125. Jensen, supra note 108, at 376.
126. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). An agent is liable for
misuse of his principal's money or property including conduct which deviates sub-
stantially from the agent's authority in a sale or purchase. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 402(g) (1958).
Failure to disclose such trading also constitutes fraud under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 implemented under the same Act. Nye v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co, 588 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1978).
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rectly actionable under federal securities law if there is a showing of
scienter. 127 That state of mind may be established by either inten-
tionally or recklessly fraudulent activity by the broker. 128
The Supreme Court of California has gone a step further, however,
and recently upheld its common law rule that an action may be main-
tained for negligent misrepresentation in the sale of corporate
stock.129 Such a claim does not require a showing of scienter, but only
an "assertion as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no
reasonable grounds for believing it to be true."130
VIII. ARBITRATION AS A MORE PROMISING FORUM
In the middle of delivering plenty of bad news to securities plain-
tiffs over the last several decades, 13 1 the Supreme Court seemed to
further exacerbate investor woes by relegating all claims against bro-
kers to an arbitration system run by the securities industry. In a line
of cases from the 1980s, the foremost of which was ShearsonlAmeri-
can Express, Incorporated v. MacMahon,132 the High Court held that
the mandatory arbitration provisions contained in virtually all agree-
ments between brokerage houses and their customers are enforceable.
That was an about-face by the Court from a previous decision in
the early 1950s, Wilko v. Swan,13 3 where it had ruled that such con-
tractual clauses were void as contrary to certain provisions in the se-
curities acts. Those sections nullified any stipulations "to waive
127. Black & Gross, supra note 111, at 1007. But see supra notes 48-49 and accompa-
nying text.
128. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
129. Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Cal. 2003).
130. Id. at 1258. For a parallel definition of the common law tort of negligent misrep-
resentation, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965). For additional
state securities provisions that are more investor-oriented than federal law, see
infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
132. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). A harbinger of the MacMahon ruling was Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), where the Court ruled that when federal
securities claims and state claims are brought in one suit, a contract to arbitrate
the state claims will be enforced.
The question whether customers actually consent to arbitration when enter-
ing into these agreements with their brokers has become a nonissue. See Richard
E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching
Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1381 (1996).
133. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Since Wilko technically dealt with a claim brought under
the Securities Act of 1933, it was distinguishable from the MacMahon action
which was a 10b-5 claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Two years
after MacMahon however, the Court directly overruled Wilko by holding that
claims under the Securities Act were also subject to arbitration in Rodriguez de
QuiJas v. Shearson American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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compliance with any provision"'134 of those statutes. The Wilko Court
buttressed its ruling by citing the avowed policy of the securities acts
to protect investors from the disadvantageous nature of their relation-
ship with the securities industry.135
Such an outlook, according to Wilko, contemplated that disgrun-
tled investors should have a wide choice of fora where they could seek
relief apart from compulsory arbitration that could lessen the effec-
tiveness of their potential remedies.136 Among other things, such a
nonjudicial venue might put investors at the mercy of the subjective
opinions of arbitrators by not affording them any written record of
their proceedings and leaving them with a sharply limited right to ap-
peal adverse decisions.13 7
But the MacMahon Court held that the no-waiver provisions were
only applicable to the substantive rights afforded securities purchas-
ers under the Acts. 138 Its broader interpretation of such provisions in
Wilko as also covering procedural rights had to be understood in light
of the then-prevalent mistrust of arbitration. 13 9 For years, the SEC
believed that arbitration would not adequately protect investor rights,
the Court noted. However, the Commission had recently adopted a
more favorable view of that process, premised in part on the expanded
power that Congress had given it to oversee arbitration. 140
Likewise, the Court itself found in MacMahon that "the stream-
lined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restric-
tion on substantive rights."141 It concluded its opinion by finding that
concerns over the limited nature of appellate review were unwar-
ranted, because "there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbi-
trators will not follow the law."142
Justice Harry Blackmun, who had frequently dissented from the
Court's earlier rulings that narrowed investor rights,143 also spoke for
the four justices in MacMahon who opposed the majority's ruling.144
As Professor James Fanto, one of Justice Blackmun's former law
clerks, has noted, Blackmun's opinion expressed a "populist skepti-
134. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000); id. § 78cc(a).
135. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-31.
136. Id. at 431.
137. Id. at 435-37.
138. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. MacMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-28 (1987).
139. Id. at 221.
140. Id. at 233.
141. Id. at 232.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
144. 482 U.S. at 242 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cism of the securities industry"145-as appropriate then as ever, the
Justice believed, in the late 1980s era of abusive merger mania. Jus-
tice Blackmun also remained unconvinced that the streamlined proce-
dures of arbitration would give plaintiffs a fair shake, and he
expressed his belief that the industry-run process was "slanted"
against investors. 146
Perhaps telling tales out of school, Professor Fanto wrote how Jus-
tice Blackmun would discuss the opinions of his judicial colleagues
with his clerks.14 7 Apparently drawing on insights garnered there,
Fanto analyzed the majority opinion in MacMahon as the product of
an "activist conservative majority" that had solidified with the ap-
pointment of Justice Scalia just before the case was argued.148
The SEC's own flip-flop to now support compulsory arbitration,
which the Court found persuasive, was itself a product of political
forces, added Fanto. It came at a time when the Commission was ac-
tively pursuing a policy of deregulation to counter charges that its
stringent rules were hindering capital formation.14 9
But contrary to Justice Blackmun's dire intuition, the law of unin-
tended consequences appears to have gone into operation here to save
investors. Five years after MacMahon, a study by the United States
General Accounting Office ("GAO") found that investors were not be-
ing disadvantaged by the process of compulsory arbitration.150 And
most studies since that time have only reinforced that view. 15 1 Arbi-
145. James A. Fanto, Justice Blackmun and Securities Arbitration: McMahon Revis-
ited, 71 N.D. L. REV. 145, 158 (1995) (construing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242-68
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
146. Id. at 159 (construing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
147. Id. at 157.
148. Id. at 159.
149. Id.
150. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-74, How INVESTORS FARE 6
(May 1992).
151. The Report of the Arbitration Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. was the most prominent of these
studies. [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,735 (Jan.
1996) [hereinafter The Ruder Report] (authored by a committee chaired by former
SEC Chairman David Ruder). Although The Ruder Report recommended a num-
ber of changes to the arbitration process, including better training for arbitrators,
it found that "securities arbitration continue[s to provide clear and significant
advantages over the civil litigation system it has replaced." Id. 87,433. See also
Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the Future
Hold? 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 202 (1996) ("The arbitration process is
geared towards a fast, inexpensive, and fair means of resolving.., disputes....
[N]o study has shown any bias in results obtained through SRO arbitrations.");
Steinberg, supra note 40, at 1505 ("[Mounting evidence shows that many inves-
tors emerge victorious from arbitration, even recovering punitive damages in ap-
propriate cases.").
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tration has turned out to be a forum quite favorable for investors,15 2
and the reason for that surprising outcome is largely owing to the na-
ture of that method itself.
Seeking to allay fears that this industry-run course of action would
be unfair to petitioners, the MacMahon Court stated that it had no
reason to believe that arbitration panels would not follow the law.15 3
However, that bow to the "rule of law" was really no help to investors,
since the trend in securities law had been moving against them. As
discussed supra,154 federal appellate decisions and legislative enact-
ments had been steadily unfavorable to plaintiffs since at least the
mid-1970s.
For instance, the scienter element now required by federal courts
in 10b-5 claims precludes actions there based on mere negligence,15 5
and the strict pleading standards codified by Congress make it diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to state a sustainable cause of action for securities
fraud.156 Most troubling for disgruntled investors bringing SCUM
claims against brokers is the fact that respondeat superior liability
seems to be ruled out against deep-pocket respondents like the houses
that employed the brokers as their sales force. 157
The distinct advantage of arbitration over litigation, however, is its
equitable nature. The Arbitrator's Manual published by the Securi-
ties Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA"), which all arbitra-
tors receive, begins with this quote from that great philosopher of
justice Aristotle:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law.... [I]t is equitable to
prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view,
152. Approximately sixty percent of the shareholder claims filed in arbitration in the
1990s were settled by brokerage houses. Paul Joseph Foley, The National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers' Arbitration of Investor Claims Against its Brokers:
Taming the Fox that Guards the Henhouse, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 239, 253 (2003).
But as Foley has noted, "With the number of claims rising and bottom lines
shrinking due to the bear market, brokers and their firms are defending them-
selves against investors' claims more vigorously than ever. In 2002, the percent-
age of claims settled fell to 37% as compared to 44% in 2001." Id. Foley also
noted that when claims proceed to full adjudication before NASD arbitration
panels, investors were awarded compensation "between 53% and 61% of the time
in each of the past five years." Id.
153. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
154. See supra Part IV.
155. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); supra notes 42 & 45 and
accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
157. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 200 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra notes 51-52 and accompany-
ing text.
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whereas the judge looks only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were
appointed was that equity might prevail.
1 5 8
Following that dictum, a seasoned Wall Street practitioner gave
this current description of the jurisprudence of arbitration: "'It's rough
justice.... If they want to give an award to someone they feel was
victimized, they'll find a way,' even if prior cases don't clearly support
their decision."15 9
In addition, state securities and common law claims that would be
precluded by current federal law are viable in arbitration. For in-
stance, liability by negligent misrepresentation apart from any show-
ing of scientert 6 O and recovery under a common law respondeat
superior theory are perfectly valid there, despite federal caselaw that
might not permit them.16'
Furthermore, most state securities codes ease the burden of plead-
ing and proof that federal plaintiffs must establish to recover in such
cases. Most importantly, the federal element of loss causation16 2 is
substantially lessened under most state law. For instance, section
509(b) of the Uniform Securities Act163 parallels section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, but unlike the federal law, 164 it provides for
civil liability for all kinds of fraudulent statements, not just those con-
tained in a registered public offering.16 5 Moreover, unlike the current
158. SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 2 (2004)
(quoting Domke on Aristotle), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/
medarb/documents/mediationarbitration/nasdw_009668.pdf.
Aristotle's notion was that equity had to exist to remedy situations where the
law produced an unjust result. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 315-17
(T.E. Page et al. eds., H. Rackham trans., new & rev. ed. 1934); see also Roger A.
Shiner, Aristotle's Theory of Equity, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1245 (1994).
As a great American writer summed up the inadequacies of our legal system,
"The law isn't justice. It's a very imperfect mechanism. If you press exactly the
right buttons and are also lucky, justice may show up in the answer. A mecha-
nism is all the law was ever intended to be." RAYMOND CHANDLER, THE LONG
GOODBYE 48 (Pocket Books 1955) (1954).
159. Brooke A. Masters, Investors v. Brokers: Meting Out Quick Justice in Murky
World of Arbitration, WASH. POST, July 15, 2003, at El (quoting Gregory J. Wal-
lance of the law firm Kaye Scholer LLP).
160. See Small v. Fritz, 65 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Cal. 2003); supra notes 129-30 and accom-
panying text.
161. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 200 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra notes 40 &
51-52 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
163. UNIF. SEC. ACT 2002 § 509(b), 7C U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 2004).
164. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995); supra note 50 and accompany-
ing text.
165. See UNIF. SEC. ACT 2002 § 509(b) cmt. 3, 7C U.L.A. 77, 79 (Supp. 2004).
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requirements of federal 10b-5 actions, 166 numerous cases under the
precursor to section 509(b) hold that neither reliance nor causation is
an element of that action.16 7
This wide discretion afforded arbitrators is buttressed by the lim-
ited review to which their rulings are subject. Panels are not even
required to write opinions justifying their decisions,168 making it even
harder for the losing party to show that they have acted with manifest
disregard of the law, the only real substantive basis for appeal. 169
Also arguing in petitioners' favor is the expedited and relatively
inexpensive nature of this form of dispute resolution.170 As opposed to
full-blown litigation, where the "search for exquisite procedural fair-
ness ... has produced a judicial process so cumbersome that ordinary
people want to avoid using it,"171 there is not much motion practice in
securities arbitration,17 2 and discovery is limited. Arbitration rules
mandate an exchange of prescribed documents, 173 but depositions are
rare. 174
In addition, arbitrators are disposed to hear out the stories of the
parties in person in a relatively informal setting, where the strict
rules of evidence do not apply.175 As a former SEC Commissioner has
approvingly stated, the system is designed to deal with "the very
166. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 361-64 (discussing the require-
ment of pleading loss causation with specificity in Rule 10b-5 actions); supra
notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
167. Rich v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 748 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1999); Kaufman v. I-Stat
Corp. 754 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 2000); Gerhard W. Gohler, IRA v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561
(Utah 1996).
168. Masters, supra note 159. Along those lines, the arbitrators are only required to
state in their award "a summary of the issues including the type(s) of any secur-
ity or product in controversy." SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBI-
TRATION PROCEDURES 23-24 (2001), available at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-
text/arb_procedures.pdf. In fact, a large majority of arbitration awards do not
contain any legal opinion justifying the decision. Black & Gross, supra note 111,
at 1030.
169. Black & Gross, supra note 111, at 1030-35. Other grounds include bias or mal-
feasance. See Masters, supra note 159.
170. The Ruder Report, supra note 151, 87,431; see also David S. Ruder, Elements of
a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1101, 1101
(1998) (stating that "generally, the parties to arbitration seek a fair, relatively
speedy, and relatively inexpensive means of resolving disputes").
171. Friedman, supra note 28, at 1500.
172. See generally MARILYN BLUMBERG CANE & PATRICIA A. SHUB, SECURITIES ARBI-
TRATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE 58-61 (1991) (discussing motions allowed during
arbitration and the procedure for filing motions at arbitration).
173. See generally SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, supra note 168, at 17-21
(discussing preparation for arbitration hearings and the procedure for exchang-
ing documents prior to hearings).
174. CANE & SHUB, supra note 172, at 63.
175. Id. at 64.
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human kind of problems" arising from "the special relationship be-
tween retail securities firms and their customers."17 6
Furthermore, since the securities industry subsidizes the cost of
arbitration proceedings and other savings arise from the limited pre-
trial practice and rights to appeal,1 7 7 this forum is more hospitable
than litigation to the small financial disputes that are often likely to
crop up in the securities context. 178 Arbitration thus offers investors
not only a relatively speedy forum to resolve their claims and recover
their losses,179 but it also holds out the possibility of a therapeutic
remedylSO by giving them a meaningful "day in court" to seek vindica-
tion for what may be a highly personalized breach of their trust. 18 1
The results of these adjudications are most likely to turn on the
particular dynamics that have been established between the individ-
ual customers and their brokers. The number of trades and the qual-
ity of investments can easily be shown by indisputable records and
rating systems. Where these cases get interesting and can present
some real drama is in determining the nature of the customers' con-
sents to the trades or their after-the-fact ratification of the
transactions. 182
As noted supra, brokers are typically compensated by commission,
and, therefore, their financial interest, at least in the short run, is on
176. Friedman, supra note 28, at 1496.
177. See J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS, ATTORNEYS, AND
INVESTORS 96-98 (1994).
178. The arbitration process run by the Securities Industry also offers a Simplified
Arbitration Procedure for small claims. See SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION, supra note 168, at 8; see also Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient
Securities Arbitration System, supra note 170, at 1105 (describing the three-tier
securities arbitration system for relatively small claims used by the NASD and
the subsequent recommendation for the adoption of this system by the Arbitra-
tion Policy Taskforce of the NASD).
179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
180. See generally JUDGING-IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003) (providing a broad
discussion on the therapeutic merits of litigating a claim); Amy D. Ronner, Songs
of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89 (2002) (providing a discussion of
the merits of therapeutic jurisprudence and specifically how this sort ofjurispru-
dence can positively impact the juvenile justice system).
181. Friedman, supra note 28, at 1496.
182. For an example of a case testing the limits of an investor's consent to a brokerage
firm's investment decisions, see Thompson v. Smith Barney, 709 F.2d 1413
(1983). See also Langevoort, supra note 107, at 1281 (noting that even though
the broker has complete discretion to make a trade, he continues to be accounta-
ble to the client for any fraudulent conduct such as churning). For a good general
discussion about other defenses that may be raised here such as laches, estoppel,
and waiver, see Thomas E. Geyer et al., Civil Liability and Remedies in Ohio
Securities Transactions, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 939, 993-96 (2002).
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"making the sale."1s 3 Federal securities laws have, from their earliest
days, recognized that reality. In his message accompanying the pro-
posed legislation that would become the Securities Act of 1933, Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt urged Congress to recognize that "every issue
of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompa-
nied by full publicity and information."'l4 Because of the intricate na-
ture of those financial instruments,185 federal law therefore reverses
the traditional presumption of caveat emptor and makes sellers dis-
close to any potential purchasers all material facts about the invest-
ments they offer.18 6
In SCUM claims, the volitional nature of the customers' decisions
is often the ultimate issue.i8 7 The age, education, and business expe-
rience of the particular investor are all relevant.18 8 However, a cus-
tomer may have been seeking a higher return than would have been
prudent, given the concomitant risk.189 Deeply philosophical ques-
tions may then arise about just what constitutes a freely chosen
course of conduct and how much individuals should be held accounta-
ble for their own initial decisions or for their failure to promptly object
to improper treatment.190
Further complicating that question are the many documents, such
as prospectuses, research reports, confirmations, and monthly state-
ments, that customers typically get from brokers.19 1 Such documents
require careful reading if they are to be fully understood, and, even
183. Friedman, supra note 28, at 1496; see supra text accompanying note 28.
184. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message from the President of the United States (Mar. 29,
1933), in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 item 15, at 1
(compiled by J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973). Despite its current soul
searching, "the S.E.C. remains one of Franklin D. Roosevelt's and his New Deal's
most signal and durable achievements." Janeway, supra note 18, at 10.
185. See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 26, at 1.
186. See id. at 1-2.
187. Many times this comes back to the issue of whether the broker has "control" over
the account. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
188. See Leckey, supra note 2. Thus the investment sophistication of the claimant is
often at issue in these disputes. See Howard L. Nations, Fraud in the Boar-
droom: Remedies for Defrauded Investors, 39 TRIAL 44, 45 (Apr. 2003).
189. As one securities litigator put it: "Cases turn on whose idea it was at the time to
make the investments. We find investors were happy when the stock market was
high, but then they develop amnesia." Edward Mason, Brokers Face Rash of An-
gry Investors, BOSTON Bus. J., June 6, 2003 (quoting Gerald Rath, Bingham Mc-
Cutchen LLP, Boston, Mass.), available at httpJ/www.bizjournals.com/boston/
stories/2003/06/09/story2.html?page=l.
190. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
191. See Black & Gross, supra note 111, at 1038.
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then, despite the SEC's recent plain-English crusade, 192 their jargon
may be incomprehensible to the lay investor. 193
In addition, clients who have trusting relationships with their bro-
kers, or are preoccupied with other matters, are not likely to give full
consideration to the information supplied by brokers. 19 4 Only when
the investments have declined in value will such customers or their
lawyers carefully examine the relevant documents.
Against that background, the judgment of the arbitrators takes on
paramount importance. Many who serve on these panels are retired
lawyers or other business professionals. 195 They are thus typically
much better informed about the securities industry and its relevant
law than an ordinary jury, and they often take an active role in the
proceedings, asking questions of both sides during the hearing.'
96
Many arbitrators say they try to bring common sense and commu-
nity standards, as they understand them, to the disputes before
them.19 7 One member of each three-person panel must be from the
securities industry.1 9 8 Even then, however, any professional empathy
such a panelist might have with the respondents may be counterbal-
anced by a desire to rout out the "bad apples" 19 9 in their business to
maintain public confidence in the system.
The global settlement reached against analysts and their firms in
2003 should also aid petitioners in their claims, because it lays out
many of the deceitful recommendations actually made by the broker-
age firms. 200 Documentation of those findings is available to the pub-
lic. In the SEC consent decree, the firms agree to sanctions without
admitting violations, so no formal issue preclusion will apply. Yet, if
an investor can show that she bought a particular stock from a broker-
192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2004) (requiring presentation of information in prospectuses
to be in plain English).
193. See, e.g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 906 F.2d 1205, 1213
(9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to relieve a broker of liability because the customer
lacked the skill to interpret various documents associated with their invest-
ments); Mihara v. Dean Witter Co., 619 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Hecht v. Harris Upham, 430 F.2d 1202, 1212 (1970)) ("[W]hile confirmation slips
were sufficient to inform plaintiff of the specific transactions made, they were 'not
sufficient to put her on notice that the trading of her account was excessive.'").
194. As pointed out earlier, brokerage firms encourage such a trust relationship. See
supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. In Mihara, the brokerage firm put
this statement in the manual it distributed to its account executives: "Our client
has a right to believe and trust you." 619 F.2d at 822.
195. Masters, supra note 159, at El.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, supra note 168, at 6.
199. Friedman, supra note 28, at 1497.
200. See Mason, supra note 189; supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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age house that induced her purchase by means of such a fraudulent
research report, liability can be almost a certainty.20 1
Additionally, even if a securities firm was not directly involved in
the initial distribution of such a stock, 'a showing of any reliance by a
broker on such tainted reports can at least raise an inference of negli-
gent misrepresentation.202 The lack of extensive discovery in these
proceedings may handicap petitioners from adducing evidence that a
particular brokerage firm participated in a scheme to defraud its cus-
tomers or was at least negligent in protecting their interests.203 Each
case, of course, will turn on its individual facts concerning such issues
as well as the particular customer's sophistication and appetite for
risk.204
IX. CLAIMS THAT MAY NOT PREVAIL IN ARBITRATION
Certain cases, however, may elicit little sympathy from an arbitra-
tion panel. One such instance would be a mere "holding claim," where
the customer's only charge is that his broker failed to get him out of a
stock at its historic high.205 While the customer may have been in-
duced to make an investment in such a security by a breach of the
broker's fiduciary duty, it may be hard to prove that all his losses were
caused when the stock price collapsed.206 A burst bubble is, after all,just a stock gone back to its rightful price.
Nor may customers who were sucked in at the market's high points
be able to show actual ill-gotten profits by their brokers. The custom-
ers at that time most likely bought their stock from knowledgeable
insiders-potentially the real culprits in the transaction-who were
taking their profits.207 In the same vein, it may be hard for disgrun-
201. Huddleston II et al., supra note 27, at 38. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note
119, at 1022, point out that this type of liability can also be established when a
broker relying on such a fraudulently optimistic report advises a client not to sell
a stock in a declining market.
202. Masters, supra note 159, at El.
203. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
204. As one commentator put it: "If the investor said in his opening document his ob-jective was speculation, there won't be a strong case against a broker who put
him in high-risk stocks.... But if the investment objective was retirement secur-
ity and preservation of capital and he was put in high-risk stocks, it's a strong
case." Leckey, supra note 2 (quoting Harry Miller, securities attorney and
founder of the Securities Fraud and Investor Protection Resource Center in
Boston).
205. But see Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 119, at 1022 (discussing a different
result when a broker induces a customer to hold a stock relying on a tainted
research report).
206. Under many state securities laws, however, loss causation is not an element re-
quired for recovery. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text. Yet the eq-
uities of such a situation would not seem to favor recovery.
207. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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tled investors to show that their brokers had any reason to disbelieve
the tainted research reports received from corrupt stock analysts.
20 8
X. CONCLUSION
Nonetheless, a pervasive aura of lax practices existed throughout
the securities industry during the late 1990s boom, especially among
brokerage firms that underwrote the high-flying stocks of that era.
Notorious examples have come to light of analysts who were fired for
their skepticism about the value of companies like Enron because such
honest assessments might have caused their firms to lose millions of
dollars in investment banking fees.
20 9
How, then, can we separate the "[truly] dishonest from the
[merely] delusional"?2 10 Arbitration panelists, like Supreme Court
justices, read the newspapers. As financially savvy individuals, they
will be aware of all this background as they sort through the claims of
investors, seeking to give an appropriate recovery to those who were
fraudulently drawn into this maelstrom.
The $1.4 billion settlement fine is just a small portion of the gigan-
tic profits earned by the securities industry during this extraordinary
bubble. Awarding rightful remedies to investors will be complicated,
but the arbitration process, as it has evolved in the last decade, offers
the best opportunity for aggrieved investors to find swift and mean-
ingful justice.
208. Such a showing of fault would be required to prove negligent misrepresentation.
See Black & Gross, supra note 111, at 1006.
209. The story of John Olson, an analyst from Merrill Lynch who appears to have been
fired for his pessimistic views about Enron, is a sad case in point. McLEAN &
ELKIND, supra note 11, at 234-35.
210. Knee, supra note 1, at 14.
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